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ABSTRACT 
With the boom of the industry of private military and security service 
provision after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of various 
transnational private regulatory initiatives, many questions have been 
posed with regard to the application of international law to these entities 
and the usefulness of transnational private regulation in ensuring their 
compliance with human rights. As there is no established tradition of this 
type of regulation in the given sector, it might be instructive to analyze 
the effectiveness of two main multi-stakeholder regimes: the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights and the International Code of 
 
* Evgeni Moyakine has been working as a doctoral candidate and researcher at the Department of 
European and International Public Law of Tilburg University, The Netherlands, and conducting a PhD research 
on the issue of State responsibility for the unlawful conduct of private military and security contractors violating 
international law. He successfully defended his PhD thesis in November 2014 and obtained a doctor’s degree; 
See EVGENI MOYAKINE, THE PRIVATIZED ART OF WAR: PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES AND 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT IN CONFLICT AREAS (2015). 
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Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. While the Voluntary 
Principles provide guidance for extractive companies as clients of 
private military and security contractors, the International Code of 
Conduct is specifically aimed at regulating the conduct of these 
contractors regarding their human rights performance and respect of 
international humanitarian law. In order to make informed conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of both regimes, the examination is based on 
the insights into such dimensions as legitimacy, enforcement and quality. 
By evaluating the architecture, functioning and major successes and 
failures of both regulatory frameworks and analyzing four above-
mentioned elements, this article investigates how important the 
initiatives are for tackling the main issues of the industry associated with 
the commission of human rights abuses by their representatives. 
[I]n the absence of a strong public law answer to the challenges posed 
by transnational activities to regulation, transnational private regulation 
offers a tool that should not simply be dismissed as ineffective and 
therefore inadequate. 
  —Nicola Jägers1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For more than two decades, a trend towards privatization of military affairs 
and security has been a global phenomenon involving the increasingly extensive 
use of private military and security companies (hereinafter: PMSCs) by a wide 
spectrum of clients ranging from States to international organizations, NGOs, and 
corporations.2 When information about human rights abuses committed at the 
Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq was released in 2004, it came to the fore 
that some employees of PMSCs hired by the U.S. government were implicated in 
these violations.3 The reached settlement in the case only indicates that actual 
perpetrators implicated in the commission of most serious crimes often escape 
any responsibility.4 Therefore, there is a definite need to regulate the industry of 
private military and security service provision on both national and international 
levels. A possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies is 
being drafted by the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries.5 
 
1. Nicola Jägers, Regulating the Private Security Industry: Connecting the Public and the Private 
Through Transnational Private Regulation, 6 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 56, 91 (2012). 
2. Id. at 59. 
3. Brent Kendall, Contractor’s Torture Settlement a Milestone, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www. 
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324442304578232070457319286. 
4. See id. 
5. National Regulatory Frameworks on PMSCs, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www. 
ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/NationalRegulatoryFrameworks.aspx (last visited 
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Among other States, some forms of domestic regulation of the industry are to be 
traced in the national laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, and South 
Africa, but the question of their effectiveness remains open.6 Against this 
backdrop, it is argued that the third type of regulatory mechanisms in form of 
transnational private regulation can be seen as a significant tool in the regulatory 
toolbox that is capable of regulating PMSCs and ensuring their compliance with 
human rights standards.7 
The current contribution builds upon the results of the case study of the 
Center for Transboundary Legal Development (hereinafter: CTLD) of Tilburg 
University carried out within the framework of the collaborative research project 
on transnational private regulatory regimes (hereinafter: TPRERs) funded by the 
Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (hereinafter: HiiL).8 It seeks to 
critically analyze two main hybrid regimes established in the field—the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (hereinafter: VPs) and the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
(hereinafter: ICoC)—from the point of view of their effectiveness.9 The 
examination is based on three particular dimensions—legitimacy, enforcement, 
and quality—that are crucial for the effectiveness of TPRERs.10 Due to the lack 
of information, specific nature of the sectors, and constant development of the 
concerned initiatives, it is impossible to make credible conclusions regarding the 
element of effectiveness, which is influenced by three above-mentioned 
dimensions and will be assessed in rather general terms. Firstly, this article 
describes two hybrid regimes and provides necessary background information on 
their functioning and governance structures.11 Secondly, the article examines the 
three elements of legitimacy, quality, and enforcement in order to evaluate the 
fourth main dimension of effectiveness.12 Finally, the article makes a number of 
conclusions regarding the VPs and the ICoC, the degree of their effectiveness 
and its possible enhancement.13 
 
Mar. 7, 2015) (listing national legislation of some States focusing on PMSCs that the Working Group has 
surveyed). 
6. Id. 
7. CENTER FOR TRANSBOUNDARY LEGAL DEVELOPMENT (CTLD), CASE STUDY FOR THE HAGUE 
INSTITUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION, PRIVATE 
SECURITY COMPANIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE OF EFFECTIVENESS? 39 (2012) [hereinafter CTLD]. 
8. Id.; Details on the case study and broader research project see also Transnational Private Regulation: 
Constitutional Foundations and Governance Design, HIIL, http://www.hiil.org/privateregulation (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2015). 
9. CTLD, supra note 7, at 11-14, 27. 
10. See id. at 8-9 (explaining the theoretical framework of the HiiL research project). 
11. See id. 
12. Id. at 11-13, 20. 
13. Id. at 15. 
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II. REGIMES UNDER CONSIDERATION 
A.  Hybrid Regimes 
There are a number of TPRERs aimed at regulating the conduct of PMSCs 
and their employees.14 In addition to trade associations, such as the International 
Stability Operations Association (hereinafter: ISOA) and the British Association 
of Private Security Companies (hereinafter: BAPSC) established on the soil of 
the United States and the United Kingdom, there are hybrid regimes also 
involving a variety of stakeholders other than PMSCs.15 In contrast to the trade 
associations safeguarding interests of their members and promoting some general 
standards, the hybrid schemes serve as an arrangement for regulating the industry 
and participating in a constructive dialogue on the incorporation of international 
humanitarian law and human rights norms and principles into specific 
commitments for companies.16 These TPRERs arguably constitute a promising 
regulatory instrument in terms of their effectiveness and are elaborated upon 
below.17 
B. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
As the oldest initiative tackling human rights concerns arising from the field 
of security, the VPs were convened and directed by the U.S. and U.K. 
governments in 2000 in order to deal with human rights issues associated with 
the extraction industry.18 The VPs only indirectly address PMSCs and specifically 
focus on the corporate clients of PMSCs from this sector.19 Its membership 
consists of representatives of three particular pillars: the government pillar, the 
NGO pillar, and the corporate pillar respectively including nine States, 10 NGOs, 
and 25 companies.20 The governance structures of the regime are comprised of 
four bodies.21 The Plenary is the main decision-making body of the initiative 
 
14. Id. at 102. 
15. CTLD, supra note 7, at 50-51. 
16. Id. at 59. 
17. Id. at 81; see also infra Part III. 
18. What are the Voluntary Principles, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY + HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2015); The Initiative 
of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights: Governance Rules, § I, (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/VPs_Governance_Rules_-_as_posted_June_ 
2014.pdf [hereinafter VPs]. 
19. See generally VPs, supra note 18. 
20. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Fact Sheet, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON 
SECURITY + HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.voluntarypri 
nciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/VPs_-_Fact_Sheet_-_January_2015.pdf (last visited Mar, 7, 
2015) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
21. VPs, supra note 18, at SEC. III ¶ 1(a). 
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consisting of all participants.22 The Steering Committee forms the main executive 
body composed of participating entities from all three pillars.23 The Secretariat is 
the administrative body of the VPs24 and its tasks are currently exercised by Foley 
Hoag’s Corporate Social Responsibility practice.25 The Voluntary Principles 
Association is an entity addressing a variety of financial and administrative needs 
of the initiative.26 The VPs provide guidelines for risk assessment and relations of 
corporations with public and private security forces.27 All participants need to 
meet a number of criteria including the requirements of publicly promoting the 
VPs, proactively implementing or assisting in the implementation of the VPs, and 
at least annually communicating publicly on the efforts to implement or assist in 
the implementation of the VPs.28 In general, the VPs is the first major hybrid 
regime indirectly focusing on the industry of PMSCs and is often perceived as a 
blueprint for other initiatives emerging in the field. 
C. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
The ICoC is a recently developed multi-stakeholder process engaging three 
types of stakeholders: States, NGOs, and PMSCs.29 The Code itself is signed by 
companies while others are in a position to issue a political statement of support. 
While in November 2010 only 58 PMSCs signed the Code at the Signatory 
Ceremony in Geneva, currently there are 708 firms participating in the 
initiative.30 The Code has been established as a result of the negotiations of 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States with a broad range of 
PMSCs, international organizations, and NGOs, such as Human Rights First and 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.31 According to a 
state official32, as it has been emphasized at the Signatory Ceremony, one of the 
major challenges was to bring stakeholders together and achieve a sufficiently 
 
22. Id. at SEC. III ¶ 2(a). 
23. Id. at SEC. III ¶ 2(b). 
24. Id. 
25. Foley Hoag LLP, CSR Practice Selected as Secretariat for Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights (Jun. 19, 2014), http://www.foleyhoag.com/news-and-events/news/2010/september/csr-practice-
selected-as-secretariat-for-voluntary-principles-on-security-and-human-rights. 
26. VPs, supra note 18, at SEC. III ¶ 2(d). 
27. Id. 
28. Participation Criteria, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY + HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www. 
voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/VPs_Participation_Criteria_Final_-_127000_v1_FHE-
DC.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Participation Criteria]. 
29. INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Anne-Marie Buzatu, Project Coordinator of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces, at the Signatory Ceremony of the Int’l Code of Conduct for Private Sec. Service Providers held in 
Geneva (Nov. 9, 2010). 
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high level of mutual trust. Within the initiative, the multi-stakeholder Steering 
Committee of 6 to 9 members is functioning as a temporary board and is 
responsible for developing the Independent Governance and Oversight 
Mechanism (hereinafter: IGOM).33 Taking the bodies of international 
humanitarian and human rights law as a starting point, the regime seeks to 
establish standards and principles for the industry of private security service 
providers.34 The corporations undertake a number of commitments relating to the 
operation in accordance with the Code, applicable law, regulations and corporate 
standards of business conduct, and commit to function, in a manner recognizing 
and supporting the rule of law, respecting human rights standards, and protecting 
the interests of their clientele.35 In addition, companies are required to take steps 
for establishing and maintaining effective internal governance frameworks and 
make available necessary means for addressing possible violations of national 
law, international law, or the Code.36 Finally, PMSCs need to cooperate with 
national and international authorities in investigations of violations of 
international humanitarian law, human rights, or international and national 
criminal law.37 
III. DIMENSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
A.  Legitimacy 
In the case study, the aspect of legitimacy has been defined as the acceptance 
that an organization has a right to govern by those it aims to govern and those on 
whose behalf it intends to govern.38 It is generally accepted that the TPRERs 
created in this field lack both the coercive capacity and automatic legitimacy of 
State regulation.39 Nevertheless, the objectives of the regimes aimed at ensuring 
respect of companies for human rights and the law of armed conflict serve as an 
indication of a certain degree of legitimacy. Inclusiveness, procedural 
transparency, and the regulators’ accountability form the main tools to examine 
the aspect of legitimacy.40 
 
33. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers at 6 ¶ 11-12 (Nov. 9, 2010), 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names. 
pdf [hereinafter ICoC]. 
34. Id. at 3 ¶ 5. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 4 ¶ 7-8. 
37. Id. at 7 ¶ 21-22. 
38. Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL), The Added Value of Private Regulation in 
an Internationalized World? Towards a Model of the Legitimacy, Effectiveness, Enforcement and Quality of 
Private Regulation, at 9, www.hiil.org [hereinafter HiiL]. 
39. Colin Scott, Regulating in Global Regimes, HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 563, 564-
565 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011). 
40. HiiL, supra note 38, at 9. 
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Inclusiveness entails the participation of the regulated entities—PMSCs and 
their clients—and beneficiaries—persons and entities affected by the conduct of 
PMSCs and their representatives (NGOs)—in the decision-making process.41 
According to a state representative, although the VPs are generally well-known 
for the active participation of various stakeholders,42 the degree of inclusion is 
low. Only major corporations from North America and Western Europe became 
part of the initiative and there is still insufficient extent of participation of States 
and NGOs.43 There is strict admissibility and participation criteria for joining the 
VPs.44 In contrast, the processes within the ICoC framework reflect the high level 
of inclusiveness due to the involvement of not only PMSCs, but also States and 
NGOs in the standard-setting and enforcement mechanisms.45 The large number 
of PMSCs that signed up to the Code indicates a fairly low threshold of 
becoming a signatory company, but the geographical spread of participating 
corporations is rather limited.46 Most of them are from the United States and the 
United Kingdom, especially those that are most actively involved in the 
functioning of the regime.47 
The following components of legitimacy are procedural transparency and 
accountability. Confidentiality and secrecy surrounding the operations of PMSCs 
is a general feature of the industry of PMSCs and the significance of more 
transparency and accountability is often accentuated.48 While the VPs’ regime 
suffers from the lack of transparency and trust among different stakeholders,49 the 
transparency of the ICoC is sufficiently ensured and participants seek to achieve 
trust and understanding. Due to the effects PMSCs’ conduct and regulators 
within the TPRERs can have on third parties, a pertinent need for accountability 
mechanisms arise.50 The element of accountability of the regulators is strongly 
connected to the availability of control and oversight instruments that are 
accepted by the regulated and by the third parties influenced by the PMSCs’ 
activities.51 The internal accountability mechanisms directed at those regulated 
concern the possibility of withdrawal and voting procedures within the VPs and 
 
41. Id. at 12. 
42. The author and his colleagues personally interviewed a State representative on September 21, 2011. 
43. VPs, supra note 18, at SEC. III ¶ 1; Fact Sheet, supra note 20. 
44. Participation Criteria, supra note 28. 
45. See Fact Sheet ICoC, Processes so Far, (Jun. 19, 2014), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ 
Fact_Sheet_ICoC_November_2011.pdf. 
46. Participation Criteria, supra note 28. 
47. Id.; see also INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS, supra note 29. 
48. Kevin A. O’Brien, What Should and What Should not Be Regulated?, in FROM MERCENARIES TO 
MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, 29, 31 (Simon Chesterman & Chia 
Lehnardt eds., 2007). 
49. JAMES COCKAYNE ET AL., BEYOND MARKET FORCES: REGULATING THE GLOBAL SECURITY 
INDUSTRY 156-157 (2009). 
50. Deirdre Curtin & Linda Senden, Public Accountability of Transnational Private Regulation: Chimera 
or Reality?, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 183 (2011). 
51. See id. at 169-70, 181-86. 
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the ICoC.52 The external accountability toward the third parties can find 
expression in a certain degree of accountability towards NGOs and other 
stakeholders engaged in both processes.53 
In sum, it appears that the dimension of legitimacy is not well-articulated in 
the VPs and needs further enhancement, while the ICoC seems to be an overall 
more legitimate process.54 
B. Quality 
This dimension is concerned with the quality of regulatory norms and is 
dependent upon three particular factors.55 In the first place, precision, 
accessibility, and practicability of the standards determine the aspect of quality.56 
The VPs aimed at guiding the conduct of corporations and establishing a 
dialogue between stakeholders has a rather general nature and contain broad 
provisions, such as the following: “companies recognize a commitment . . . to be 
mindful of the highest applicable international standards.”57 As expectations are 
directed at companies, this approach arguably facilitates more flexibility of the 
process focused on a variety of corporations operating in different contexts and 
meets the need of adjusting to societal changes.58 The ICoC distinguishes itself 
from the VPs by its specific provisions relating to the conduct of PMSCs 
including rules on the use of force, prohibition of torture, and other matters.59 
The following set of factors influencing the aspect of quality is comprised by 
complementarity and consistency entailing the degree to which TPRERs 
complement existing public legal frameworks and other TPRERs and are 
consistent with them. While the VPs contain references to the vague notions of 
human rights and international humanitarian law, the document also specifically 
mentions the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,60 the UN Code of Conduct 
for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,61 and ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
 
52. CTLD, supra note 7, at 12. 
53. Id. at 66. 
54. Id. at 63-64, 78. 
55. Id. at 12. 
56. Id. 
57. VPs, supra note 18, at Appendix 1, A-1. 
58. TINEKE E. LAMBOOIJ, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND SEMI-LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
SUPPORTING CSR: DEVELOPMENTS 2000-2010 AND CASE STUDIES 252 (2010). 
59. Compare ICoC, supra note 33, at 8-11 ¶ 28-43 (listing specific principles regarding the conduct of 
personnel, including rules for general conduct, rules for the use of force, rules for detention, rules for 
apprehending persons, and prohibitions of torture or other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) 
with Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 25. 
60. Introduction and Interactions Between Companies and Private Security, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON 
SECURITY + HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2015). 
61. Id. at 4-5. 
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Principles and Rights at Work.62 The ICoC also refers not only to the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,63 but 
also the Montreux Document and the UN “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” 
framework.64 Both codes of conduct, however, do not include references to other 
TPRERs established in this particular field or other sectors.65 
With regard to the dimension of quality, it can be observed that on the one 
hand the ICoC is to be perceived as initiative making a relatively strong claim of 
being a high quality TPRER, certainly considering precision and accessibility of 
its provisions, and complementarity and consistency with international norms and 
standards. On the other hand, the quality of the VPs lags behind. 
C. Enforcement 
It is obvious that the guidelines laid down in the codes of conduct need to be 
enforced in order to have effect on those regulated by the TPRERs. Some go as 
far as to assert that effective regulation must be in place in order for the TPRERs 
to even be perceived as a form of regulation.66 Enforcement comprises all 
possible activities aimed at ensuring compliance of regulated entities with 
regulatory norms.67 It implies not only ex post enforcement mechanisms, such as 
remedies and sanctions, but also ex ante instruments in form of monitoring and 
supervision.68 TPRERs established in the field of private security service 
provision are largely at the stage of standard setting and implementation and lack 
effective enforcement instruments, which is a feature common to many 
TPRERs.69 
The VPs have ex ante enforcement instruments in form of an obligation to 
publicly report on the implementation steps taken by the participants.70 Failure to 
comply with this obligation can render the participants’ status inactive.71 In 
addition, in cooperation with States, the member companies are encouraged to 
participate in in-country processes in order to integrate the VPs into the local 
 
62. Id. 
63. ICoC, supra note 33, at arts. 32, 59(c). 
64. Id. at Preamble, arts. 2-3. 
65. See id.; Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 25. 
66. Colin Scott, Non-judicial Enforcement of Transnational Private Regulation, ENFORCEMENT OF 




69. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Introduction: The Transformation of Transnational Private Regulation: 
Enforcement Gaps and Governance Design, in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING 
COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD1, 6147, 147-150, (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed. 2012). 
70. Participation Criteria, supra note 28, at 1-2. 
71. Id. at 2. 
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practices of host counties and promote a dialogue among different stakeholders.72 
Participants also have a possibility to file complaints with the dispute resolution 
mechanism regarding the non-compliance of each other with the duty to 
implement the VPs.73 As a result, non-complying participants can be expelled 
from the initiative with the unanimous decision.74 
As to the ICoC, at the drafting conference that took place in Montreux on 
February 19-22, 2013 PMSCs, national governments and civil society 
organizations reached an agreement on the final text of the charter of the IGOM, 
the so-called Articles of Association.75 According to a state representative, on 
September 19-20, 2013, the initiative launched in Geneva the International Code 
of Conduct Association (hereinafter: ICoCA) that could potentially form an 
effective governance and oversight mechanism without which the Code itself 
would be a dry and meaningless document.76 In addition to national courts and 
public forums of civil society organizations, the IGOM offers the third platform 
for holding private military and security corporations accountable.77 The non-
profit Association is created as a multi-stakeholder initiative and constitutes an 
independent legal entity with legal capacity under Swiss law.78 It is aimed at not 
only promoting, governing, and overseeing implementation of the ICoC, but also 
promoting “the responsible provision of security services and respect for human 
rights and national and international law in accordance with the Code.”79 The 
Association is responsible for monitoring, reporting and assessing the 
participants’ performance80 and maintaining a third party complaints process.81 
The members of the Association are divided into three stakeholder pillars: private 
security companies and private security service providers; governments, and civil 
society organizations.82 As of June 2014, 162 private corporations have joined the 
ICoCA.83 In addition, six States, including Australia, Norway, Sweden, 
 
72. See id. at 1, 3. 
73. VPs, supra note 18, at 31-32. 
74. Participation Criteria, supra note 28, at 3. 
75. See Eidgenossisches Department Fur auswartige Angelegenheiten, SWISS CONFEDERATION (Jun. 19, 
2014), http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/media/single.html?id=47889. 
76. The author and his colleagues personally interviewed a State representative. This information was 
obtained from that interview. As stressed by Andrew Clapham in the panel discussion that took place at the 
Signatory Ceremony of the ICoC held in Geneva on Nov. 9, 2010. 
77. The author and his colleagues personally interviewed a State representative. This information was 
obtained from that interview. 
78. ICoC, Articles of Association, art. 1.1, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_ 
Association.pdf [hereinafter ICoC Articles]. 
79. ICoC Articles, art. 2.2. 
80. Id. at art. 12. 
81. Id. at art. 13. 
82. Id. at art. 3.1. 
83. International Code of Conduct Association, Members of the ICoC Association: Private Security 
Service Providers (Jun. 19, 2014), http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/international_regulation/global_ 
standards_codes_of_conduct/icoca-member-companies_june-2014.pdf [hereinafter ICoCA]. 
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Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, belong to the members 
of the Association.84 Among the participants, one can also find 13 civil society 
organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch and One Earth Future.85 The 
main bodies of the ICoCA are the General Assembly, the Board of Directors, and 
the Secretariat.86 The General Assembly is the governing body of the Association 
comprising all participants that provides a venue for voting on different matters 
and engaging in a multi-stakeholder dialogue and discussion.87 The Board of 
Directors functions as the executive decision-making organ composed of twelve 
Directors with four seats for every pillar.88 At the moment, the Board is in the 
process of developing procedures for company certification and monitoring and 
for the complaints mechanism.89 The Secretariat supervised by an Executive 
Director has as its core task the execution of the decisions of the Board and 
maintaining records required for the governance of the Association.90 In addition, 
there is also an Advisory Forum of Montreux Document Participants serving as a 
resource for the Board of Directors and giving advice to the ICoCA concerning 
national and international policy and regulatory matters.91 
Next to the use of ex ante and ex post enforcement mechanisms, an 
alternative means of enforcement should be distinguished in which the clientele 
of PMSCs can play a crucial role.92 As observed by Doug Brooks, the founder of 
ISOA and now President Emeritus of this association, “standards never change 
unless the client pays attention to the standards.”93 Therefore, of particular 
importance is the concept of the so-called redeployment purporting that initially 
voluntary guidelines, such as those included in codes of conduct, acquire a 
certain degree of legal bindingness when they are incorporated into the contracts 
concluded between PMSCs and their clients or are used as benchmarks.94 In this 
regard, voluntary commitments function as legal norms when several gatekeepers 
contracting PMSCs require companies to comply with a code of conduct. Over 
time, such instruments of private regulation obtain a compulsory status and can 
 
84. ICoCA, Members of the ICoC Association: States (Jun. 19, 2014), http://www.icoca.ch/assets/icoca-
member-states_january-20142.pdf. 
85. Id. 
86. ICoC Articles, supra note 78, at art. 5.1. 
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be regarded as being legally binding to a greater extent than international 
conventions having their own limitations.95 In this process, States appear to play 
the crucial role by including the guidelines of codes of conduct in the public 
procurement policies and taking an active stance in the establishment and 
development of TPRERs.96 The VPs—often criticized for the lack of active State 
support97—experienced a surge in development after the involvement of the U.S. 
government.98 Some investors also already take the VPs as a benchmark while 
financing certain projects: the World Bank requires, for instance, the extractive 
projects under its support to be compatible with the Code.99 The VPs specifically 
provide that, where it is appropriate, companies should include the outlined 
standards in the contractual agreements with private security providers.100 The 
ICoC also contains a requirement for signatory companies to make compliance 
with the Code an integral part of contracts with subcontractors, personnel and 
other parties performing security services under these contractual agreements.101 
While the results of the empirical study indicate that various companies 
participating in the ICoC comply with it, there are corporations lacking any 
knowledge or understanding of this redeployment provision.102 In addition to the 
references to the VPs and the ICoC in contracts and their use as benchmarks, the 
adherence of PMSCs to the TPRERs can be made compulsory by clients or 
insurers.103 For example, PMSCs willing to be hired by the US in Afghanistan 
were required to become members of the ISOA in order to win a contract.104 
The current state of affairs makes clear that the aspect of enforcement is 
rather under-developed in both regimes. The ICoCA, however, constitutes a 
potentially strong enforcement mechanism capable of ensuring compliance of 
PMSCs with the standards of the code. In this regard, the main clients of these 
corporations and other possible gatekeepers need to be actively involved in the 
functioning of the instrument and redeployment of the standards in question.105 
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D. Effectiveness 
The element of effectiveness has been identified as the extent to which 
TPRERs under analysis meet their own objectives.106 It is influenced by not only 
legitimacy and quality of the regulatory processes, but also enforcement 
instruments established by the given regimes.107 A distinction is made between 
two particular dimensions of effectiveness: formal and substantive.108 Formal 
effectiveness is concerned with the process of measuring compliance with the 
rules of TPRERs.109 Substantive effectiveness is measured against the 
achievement of regulatory objectives of the initiatives.110 It implies that regulatory 
objectives and regulatory instruments to achieve them are clear and well-
defined.111 
From the perspective of regulatory relationships, the concept of effectiveness 
is not only capable of measuring compliance of regulated parties with the norms 
of a regime, but is also concerned with the effects of the regulatory process on 
the beneficiaries of the regulation.112 Examined from the angle of institutional 
complementarity, effectiveness of transnational private regulation appears to 
depend on the credibility and legitimacy of public institutions, such as the 
judicial bodies on the national and international levels.113 When hybrid regimes 
emerge that include both public and private actors, it increases effectiveness due 
to the fact that various stakeholders participate in the process of rule-making.114 
Effectiveness of such initiatives must be assessed in terms of possibilities to 
ensure that private law-making achieves its promised goals and the question what 
principles must be used to implement consistency between means and ends.115 
The degree of effectiveness, just as legitimacy, depends on different relationships 
of recognition that TPRERs enter into with their surroundings: for instance, 
interaction with and connection to other normative orders, such as state legal 
systems and other TPRERs.116 It is, however, also true that in practice there might 
be a difference between the effectiveness as perceived by the members of a 
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TPRER and the ability of a regime to meet its own regulatory objectives.117 In the 
final analysis, the effectiveness of private rule-making necessarily entails the 
question “to what extent the rules as drafted and implemented have been able to 
achieve the expected and declared regulatory objectives.”118 
Before going into the substance of the analysis of effectiveness of the VPs 
and the ICoC, the specific nature of this particular industry and the environment 
of the operation of its representatives need to be stressed. The industry of PMSCs 
is familiar with many rogue corporations that appear, disappear and reappear 
again under a different name in a different location when governments seek to 
regulate their activities or human rights are violated and the companies’ image 
sustains damage.119 Such was the situation in South Africa after the adoption of 
the South African Foreign and Military Assistance Act in 1998 banning all 
mercenary activity.120 When the act was passed, many private security firms 
decided to reconstitute themselves, relocate to other States or enter the illegal 
market beyond the influence of government.121 Similar practices within the 
industry characterized by a high level of secrecy undoubtedly have a negative 
impact on the legitimacy of the industry and undermine effective attempts to 
regulate the compliance of its representatives with human rights.122 In addition, 
PMSCs are often to be found in conflict areas with the absence of the rule of law, 
which makes the effective implementation of TPRERs nearly impossible.123 
A number of evaluation points should be taken into account in the 
assessment of effectiveness: industry commitment and capacity, private interests 
as a driving force behind establishing TPRERs, government pressure and 
oversight, availability of credible sanctioning policies and means to render this 
type of regulation effective, such as design indicators and impact indicators.124 In 
the HiiL case study, design indicators were seen as means and mechanisms 
making regulation effective, while impact indicators were understood as the 
perception of effectiveness by regulated parties and third parties, since it was 
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deemed not possible to measure the actual impact of the TPRERs within the 
scope of the research.125 
The initiative of the VPs seeking to regulate the conduct of extractive 
companies and indirectly influencing PMSCs has experienced little commitment 
from the industry towards the achievement of the regime’s objectives.126 
According to an NGO representative, merely a small number of corporations 
have become part of the initiative and comply with the Code as long as there is 
an added value of doing so.127 The companies are largely driven by the main 
desire to improve the overall image of the industry and individual companies and 
secure contract possibilities.128 These reputational concerns and commercial 
considerations appear to be in line with the core aim of the VPs to ensure 
protection of human rights of the local population in the areas where companies 
operate.129 As a primary matter of concern, a general lack of governmental 
pressure was indicated in the qualitative empirical research.130 Enforcement and 
oversight instruments are considered rather weak and underdeveloped.131 
Sanctioning policies available to the process are also ineffective and are based on 
the possibility of expelling a participant or declaring its status inactive.132 Design 
indicators of the VPs are constituted in the first instance by the set of 
performance indicators for member companies developed by the participating 
NGO International Alert.133 In addition, there is a reporting requirement, 
according to which every participant has to report to the Plenary regarding its 
efforts to implement the VPs.134 According to a State representative, in general, 
stakeholders and third parties do not perceive the VPs to constitute an effective 
process and often criticize it for lacking teeth and being ineffective.135 Due to the 
low levels of legitimacy, quality and enforcement, the effectiveness of the VPs 
remains very limited. 
Currently, the ICoC initiative is making significant steps towards the 
regulation of the PMSCs’ industry: the ICoCA has recently been launched and it 
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might be too early to speak of the effectiveness of the regime as a whole.136 A 
number of general observations, however, are in order. It is obvious that there is 
a fairly high degree of industry commitment and support of States and trade 
organizations for the ICoC.137 As the main reason for the PMSCs to become 
signatory parties to the regime reputational concerns and more competitiveness 
on the market have frequently been articulated, and it perfectly aligns with the 
aims of the initiative.138 Upon its establishment, the Association aims at ensuring 
monitoring, reporting and assessment of the participants’ performance and 
operating a third party complaints process.139 In sum, the ICoC potentially holds 
the strongest promise for effectiveness due to its level of legitimacy, quality of 
the norms and standards and, most importantly, its elaborate governance and 
oversight mechanism substantially improving the dimension of enforcement.140 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Two hybrid rights-based transnational private regulatory frameworks directly 
or indirectly focusing on PMSCs constitute a reaction to numerous corporate 
human rights violations that should not be underestimated.141 These regimes 
remain, without doubt, voluntary initiatives in which firms can participate or 
abstain from any involvement, but voluntary in a strict legal sense they acquire a 
degree of binding authority from not only the social and economic points of 
view142, but also from the legal perspective in case of re-deployment. 
Considering the effectiveness of the VPs and the ICoC, it follows that the 
absence of effective oversight and enforcement mechanisms ensuring 
implementation of the codes and respect of the standards by the participants 
severely diminishes the capacity of the TPRERs to achieve their objectives.143 It 
is evident that the lack of credible and effective enforcement mechanisms 
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common to transnational private regulation in general makes them ineffective.144 
In this regard, the ICoC will potentially serve as an example of the initiative 
capable of establishing and maintaining an effective enforcement process and be 
significantly more effective than its predecessors. In the same vein, the ICoC as a 
self-regulatory framework involving PMSCs that undertake to participate in the 
process and comply with the standards concerned has the advantage of directly 
addressing these business entities and surpassing limitations and weaknesses of 
international law.145 It is also clear that effectiveness of both the VPs and the 
ICoC is to a great degree dependent upon the active participation and support of 
States and other stakeholders, such as clients, insurance companies and NGOs 
playing a central role of gatekeepers.146 It might be apparent, however, that to 
engage more stakeholders and encourage them to function as such, a higher level 
of transparency of the processes is necessary. 
Currently, there is a long way to go for the ICoC and especially the VPs to 
become more effective. Obviously, the industry of PMSCs with its peculiarities 
and challenges can hardly be regulated by the TPRERs alone: what is needed is a 
balanced exercise147 of creating a smart mix of measures of international, national 
and transnational character.148 Only this method of using a variety of regulatory 
instruments will prove to be undeniably effective in achieving the ultimate goal 
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